> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.denar.markets/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Mint and redeem

> How dUSD enters and leaves circulation: 1:1 against USDG at the treasury, with a redemption path that pulls from the liquid buffer first and unwinds the lending position automatically when it must.

<Note>
  Live since September 4, 2026. The deployed parameters:

  | Parameter                   | Value                                                                           |
  | --------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
  | Mint fee / redeem fee       | 0% / 0%                                                                         |
  | Pilot mint cap              | 10,000 dUSD                                                                     |
  | Liquid buffer floor         | 10% of outstanding dUSD                                                         |
  | Lending vault leg           | up to 50% of the treasury's USDG, 2% harvest-side haircut                       |
  | SGOV rotation               | at most 20% of outstanding dUSD per day, fills within 1% of the Chainlink price |
  | Retained equity             | 1% of the larger of liability and risky reserve                                 |
  | Performance fee on harvests | 10%                                                                             |

  Each is an owner parameter; changes are on-chain and listed in the [changelog](/changelog).
</Note>

## Minting

Deposit USDG, receive dUSD, one for one, minus the mint fee if one is set:

```
dUSD out = USDG in × (1 − mint fee)
```

There is no oracle in this path and no price to cross — a mint is a deposit into the treasury's book, not a trade. Whatever you mint, the reserve grows by exactly the USDG you brought, so minting can never dilute existing holders.

Fees on both legs are governance parameters that start at industry standard — **zero** — and exist mainly as peg-defense levers. Any fee collected becomes reserve surplus, which flows to sdUSD stakers at the next harvest, not to the treasury operator.

## Redeeming

Redemption burns your dUSD and pays USDG from the treasury, again 1:1 minus the redemption fee if one is set. The treasury looks for your dollars in order:

<Steps>
  <Step title="The liquid buffer">
    A protocol-enforced share of the reserve is always held as plain USDG. Ordinary redemptions end here, in one transaction.
  </Step>

  <Step title="Auto-unwind from the lending vault">
    If the buffer is short, the treasury automatically withdraws exactly the difference from its position in the Denar USDG vault — inside the same redemption transaction, at the vault's normal share price, with no discount imposed on anyone. If the vault cannot pay that difference on the spot, the redemption reverts rather than paying less.
  </Step>

  <Step title="Keeper rotation from SGOV">
    T-bill holdings cannot be sold atomically (SGOV trades through Rialto, off-chain quoted). If a redemption exceeds even the vault's liquidity, it reverts rather than paying a worse price — and keepers rotate SGOV back to USDG to refill the buffer, bounded by the Chainlink price and a rolling daily volume allowance.
  </Step>
</Steps>

<Tip>
  The design principle: a redemption either pays **a full dollar** or it waits. There is no haircut path, no fee escalation under stress, and no gate that pays early exits from later holders' backing.
</Tip>

## The buffer floor

The treasury cannot invest through its own redemption liquidity: rotating USDG into SGOV, or parking it in the lending vault, is blocked whenever it would leave the liquid buffer below an enforced floor (a percentage of outstanding dUSD). The floor is a contract check, not an operator habit.

## What the treasury can redeem

The treasury redeems only what it minted. dUSD is one fungible token, but the [allocator](/dusd/reserve#system-wide-backing) also mints dUSD straight into the lending markets, and that dUSD is backed by borrowers' collateral rather than by the treasury's USDG. So the treasury pays out against its own book: the contract's `redeemable()` view reports, at any moment, the smaller of what the treasury has minted and what its liquid USDG plus the vault's *declared* liquidity can pay, and zero while redemptions are paused. A Morpho Vault V2 declares none, so that figure is a floor: the app estimates the real one from the vault position, and a redemption the vault cannot serve reverts in the wallet before anything is signed. A redemption above what the treasury can pay reverts rather than dipping into equity that belongs to other holders.

Two small edges, stated so nobody trips on them: a redemption worth less than one micro-dollar of USDG is refused rather than burned for nothing, and the redemption fee, if one is ever set, is taken on the USDG side.

## When mint or redeem can pause

The owner can pause minting and redemption independently — an emergency brake, deliberately blunt and visible on-chain. Beyond that, the treasury inherits one external dependency worth stating plainly: **USDG itself is an issued stablecoin** (Paxos). If its issuer froze the treasury's USDG, redemptions would halt for as long as the freeze lasted. The same dependency applies to every USDG protocol on the chain, Denar's lending markets included.